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TICOM/I-115

FURTHER INTERROGATION OF OBERSTLT. METTIG OF OKW/CHI ON THE GERMAN WIRELESS SECURITY SERVICE (FUNKUEBERWACHUNG)

CSDIC (UK) report SIR. 1726, of 17th September, 1945 is re-issued herewith to Ticom I recipients.

The report covers,(inter alia), PW's account of:-

(a) The organisation of OKW/Chi as regards Wireless Security Service (FUNKUEBERWACHUNG).

(b) Referat VAUCK.

(c) Allied Agent activities as seen through Wireless Security Service.

See also Ticom/I- 17,48, 78, 86 and 96 for earlier reports on this prisoner.

Ticom
22 September 1945

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C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.)
S.I.R. 1726
17 Sep 45.

THIS REPORT IS TOP SECRET

Report on further information obtained from PW CS/2318 Obstlt METTIG OKW/Ag WNV/Chi, captured at RHEIMS, 15 May 45.

G E R M A N W I R E L E S S S E C U R I T Y S E R V I C E

(F U N K Ü B E R W A C H U N G)

(This report should be read in conjunction with SIR 1106)

PREAMBLE

1. PW was head of the OKH Cryptographic Service from 41 - Jun 43. In Dec 43 he took up a leading position in OKW/Chi. In these capacities, and through liaison work which he undertook, he acquired a fair knowledge of the general workings of the German Wireless Security Intercept Service. PW, however, is not an expert on this subject, and the information given is therefore only of moderate reliability.

GENERAL ORGANISATION

2. OKW/Fu

Since the beginning of the war OKW/Fu directed all WT traffic in Greater GERMANY and in occupied territory insofar as it did not concern the Army and the SS. In conjunction with the Reichspost, OKW/Fu gave permission for transmissions, distributed frequencies and call-signs to Army agencies, Government agencies and industries, and was responsible for the distribution of codes. These matters were the concern of Gruppe I (Organisation and Tactical employment) and Gruppe II (Supply). Gruppe III was responsible for WT security and as such controlled the agencies that enforced it.

OKW/Fu III

3. Wireless intercept units enforcing Signals Security came under the direction of Gruppe III. PW has no knowledge of the development of this Gruppe up to 41, as he had no contact with it until the beginning of 42.

4. The scope of wireless security intercept grew with the increase of wireless traffic of Allied agents. Available personnel was almost insufficient to handle the work. To meet this shortage of staff, existing long-range intercept coys were adapted for security intercept at the conclusion of the campaign in the West in 40. They were called Funküberwachung coys. The first coy to be organised was an intercept coy from Nachr Abt 9. It was re-equipped with short-wave receivers and short-wave base direction finders.

5. The Central control of commitments, evaluation and

GENERAL ORGANISATION (cont)

OKW/Fu III (cont)

coordination with other departments (Abwehr, Orpo, Gestapo, In 7/VI, OKW/Chi) was handled by Fu III in BERLIN. As the main effort of Fu III was in FRANCE, a branch office was set up there and known as Aussenstelle PARIS.

6. In autumn 44, the security intercept units were organised into a regt under comd of Maj v BARY. This was done for administrative purposes and did not affect the tactical employment of wireless intercept nor Maj v BARY's duties as Gruppenleiter of Fu III.

7. It can easily be seen that, owing to the large number of agencies involved in this work, difficulties arose. These were aggravated by mistrust, jealousy and competition in claiming successes. At no time was it possible to unify these services under one comd. Perhaps this might have been achieved by bringing them together under the RSHA and by transferring v BARY's newly formed wireless intercept regt to Mil Amt E; but in fact it was never done.

MOVEMENTS OF Fu III

8. It was intended to transfer Fu III (Regt v BARY) from BERLIN to HALLE, and from there to Southern GERMANY by the end of Mar 45. Owing to the military situation the move from HALLE did not take place. PW cannot give information as to the whereabouts of Fu III after Mar 45.

METHODS OF OPERATION

Interception of Agents' Traffic

9. In German-occupied areas the picking-up service was carried out by strategically placed Wireless Intercept Coys. The results of identified traffic were sent directly to BERLIN by daily courier or through Aussenstelle PARIS. Particularly important transmissions were notified to BERLIN in advance by teleprinter. For this purpose Fu III maintained its own teleprinter station in BERLIN.

10. In order that unauthorised wireless traffic might be more easily recognised, Fu III ordered that, apart from the regular wireless traffic of the Army and its replacement and training units, all proposed wireless traffic should be submitted to OKW/Fu for authorisation. This security precaution led to a weakness of which advantage was taken in some cases by Allied agents, who made their transmissions appear outwardly similar to those of the German Army.

11. Units of the Orpo were also used in WT intercept work.

Deciphering of Agents' Traffic

12. The department carrying out this work was a Referat in In 7/VI (Oblt Dr VAUCK and Wm KOEHLER), located in BERLIN, three houses away from the evaluation centre of Fu III. In this way the closest cooperation was secured. When Fu III moved to DORF ZINNA, 2 miles NW of JÜTERBOG, in autumn 43, Referat VAUCK moved with it. The delay in delivery of messages to Referat VAUCK was nevertheless so great - due to the defective courier service and the registration of messages in the evaluation centre of Fu III, especially in those cases where the code had already been partly broken - that it became necessary to attach representatives of Referat VAUCK to Aussenstelle PARIS and later to other places also.

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METHODS OF OPERATION (cont)

Direction Finding

13. DF worked on the following principle. Wireless traffic picked up was DFd by Adcock long-base triangulation sets belonging to the Navy, Army and Police and the approximate area of transmission established. PW believes that Adcock long-base DF points were sited at KÖNIGSBERG, WARSAW, VIENNA, BERLIN, KIEL, DEUTSCHE BUCHT, SENGWARDEN, area MÜNSTER, LANGENARGEN, and later also SOUTH of PARIS. Once an approximate area had been located, the nearest Wireless Intercept Coy was utilised for short-base intercept, sometimes assisted by Army cooperation planes. The use of the latter method brought good results in large cities and inaccessible areas (NORWAY).

14. The DF service at first worked with excellent results. It led to the apprehension of many Allied agents. Results diminished because the danger of DF was appreciated by the Allies and their agents protected themselves by using irregular times for transmission and by changing frequencies, positions etc. Thus an agent in WARSAW in 42 was able to avoid detection from short-base DF by having several transmitters all connected in one circuit and operated by remote control. Only later on was he apprehended owing to deciphered transmissions.

15. The decrease in the successes obtained by DF was possibly the reason why Fu III in spring 42 began to press for the establishment of its own deciphering section. From their side OKW and OKH were anxious that no more independent cryptographic units should be organised, as this hindered their policy of securing unity in cryptoanalytic techniques and evaluation methods. It was planned that OKW/Chi should organise a unit for deciphering agents' transmissions for Fu III, but they declined owing to lack of personnel. After that, OKH In 7/VI was given the job, even though this unit, as the highest Army cryptographic agency, had nothing to do with wireless intercept as employed by OKW.

Arrest of Agents

16. The apprehension of agents was not carried out by wireless intercept personnel. Fu III gave the necessary information about agents whom they considered ripe for arrest to the proper authorities Abwehr (?), Gestapo and Orpo.. Arrest, questioning, etc were then carried out by these authorities, who were opposed to the presence of sigs intelligence personnel. Very occasionally Fu III was represented in these operations by a small group from a Wireless Intercept Coy. Only towards the end of 42 were representatives of Referat VAUCK permitted to take part in at least some of these actions. Previously bad errors had been made in securing and exploiting enemy cipher material, which rarely reached Referat VAUCK or, if it did, was delayed for several weeks.

PUBLICATIONS OF FU III

17. Fu III published a monthly report of its activities in the form of a printed booklet of approximately 70 to 80 pages. About 70 copies of this booklet were printed. It contained most exact information concerning operational activities, current interception and DF work, successes in cryptoanalysis, contents of deciphered texts, and information about the completed and planned apprehension of agents. Owing to the fact that this report was distributed to low levels in the occupied areas, it constituted a great danger to the security of the entire work of wireless intercept. Because of this, OKW/Chi constantly fought against its publication, but only towards the end of 44 was it possible at least to curtail its contents. PW was convinced that by the time of the invasion, if not earlier, some of these reports were captured by the enemy.

REFERAT VAUCK

Formation

18. Oblt Dr VAUCK, a mathematician, was ordered to report to In 7/VI in spring 42 for a cryptographic course. There he proved to be a very able cryptographer and was selected to be Referatsleiter of Referat "Agenten". This Referat was just being formed under Wm KOEHLER. It had to be commanded by an officer so that its interests could be properly represented to other agencies. VAUCK was first of all made familiar with the practical work and the current methods of other sections for approximately four weeks.

Liaison

19. Referat VAUCK achieved good results owing above all to VAUCK's leadership and his personal cryptographic successes. VAUCK demanded quick and close liaison with OKH/Fu III, and maintained that his section, by reason of the nature of its work, should have been permanently attached to that department. In order to ensure the closest possible liaison with the other interested authorities (Abwehr, Gestapo and Orpo), personnel of Referat VAUCK were detached to branches of wireless security intercept in PARIS and later BRUSSELS.

20. Thus VAUCK became involved in the many quarrels between Fu III, Abwehr, Gestapo and Orpo. Fu III proved particularly obstructive; but relations with the Gestapo and Abwehr improved. VAUCK already knew some members of the Abwehr and Gestapo as he had worked with them on the SCHULZE-BOYSEN case. VAUCK's method of work was quicker and more flexible than the methods of Fu III and was closely akin to the business-like operations of the Kriminalräte of the Gestapo. Effective liaison in Western EUROPE was soon secured.

21. Among the first agent cryptographers to be posted to PARIS was Dr LENZ. Later on he was transferred to the NICE area where he was stationed at the beginning of the invasion. Through these postings a manpower shortage was felt. VAUCK - together with Wm KOEHLER, who was also an excellent cryptographer - became indispensable experts at the head office. Consequently, VAUCK could not obtain his release for front-line service in Jan 45, in spite of earlier promises which had been made to him.

Development of activities

22. When in spring 42 Referat VAUCK started on its work of breaking Allied agents' traffic, it was confronted with a completely new and difficult task. Success could not be achieved by merely using the normal methods of cracking Army or diplomatic ciphers. The peculiar construction of agents' ciphers, and in particular the frequent changes of ciphers, demanded new methods of approach. Agent cryptographers had not only to be highly enthusiastic about their work and very flexible in their approach, but it was also desireable that a percentage (considerably larger than in normal cryptography) be expert linguists.

23. The early research work of the Referat, carried out in close cooperation with the evaluation section of Fu III, was devoted to clarifying the use of call signs, and to ascertaining systems of indicator groups and coding tables in different procedures. Material, in the shape of old messages which had been gathered in the past, was re-examined. Simultaneously a search began for possible sources of compromise within the various ciphers under investigation.

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REFERAT VAUCK (contd)

24. To supplement this research work an arrangement was made with the appropriate agencies to allow representatives of Referat VAUCK to take part in important arrests and in the interrogation of agents. Owing to a shortage of personnel in the Referat it was impossible to take full advantage of this concession. The concession was granted because it was recognised that when an agent was arrested and no cryptographer was present, cipher material, which was usually well camouflaged, was not recognised as such and therefore could not be properly utilised. Furthermore, the material was often not evaluated correctly and delays ensued in forwarding it. Sometimes ambitious amateurs wished to earn credit for themselves by exploiting cipher material. Another danger lay in the fact that when cipher experts were not present, agents might tend to give false or imaginary cipher information. In these cases the presence of an expert was of great value. Agents under interrogation who saw that their cipher methods had been compromised usually gave good signals information. Once the value of Dr VAUCK's assistance was recognised, his section were frequently called in to assist the Abwehr and Gestapo in their work.

25. It became possible, with the advice of Referat VAUCK, either to turn round more agents or to play back the agents' wireless personality using German personnel. Errors occurred in this field when signals personnel were not present. Thus in the beginning of 44 it was ascertained that two Allied agents who had been turned round by the Abwehr were operating in a villa SE of BORDEAUX and were being handed clear messages for encipherment and transmission, without any supervision. FW does not know how much damage was caused by this carelessness.

26. FW cannot give any accurate details of playing back activities in which Referat VAUCK participated. Dr VAUCK told him that shortly before the beginning of the invasion twelve links, operated either by German personnel or by agents turned round, were running from FRANCE to ENGLAND. Of these twelve links, the Germans intended in six cases to reveal in the course of transmission that the cipher had been broken and that the agent was being played back. It was hoped thereby to confuse the British Intelligence Service, so that they would begin worrying which other of their many links were compromised. FW does not know whether, and if so with what success, this operation was carried out.

Cipher Techniques Investigated

27. Even though it was not always possible for Referat VAUCK to break into the cipher system of Allied agents by purely analytical means, it was in many instances possible to solve and decipher techniques with growing success by using special methods. The employment of cryptographers for solving corrupt messages, i.e. for the correction of a text which had been deformed through bad reception or in deciphering, was very valuable. Useful aid in securing small inroads into very difficult ciphers was provided by the content of other WT traffic that had been solved, by establishing which language was the basis of a cipher, or by collating information on agents' code names, signatures and numbers as revealed by interrogations and traffic evaluation. Once these inroads were achieved they could be cryptographically exploited.

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REFERAT VAUCK (contd) 28. FW states that a special weakness of Allied agents' ciphers was the use of books for enciphering. Usually only a minor inroad or other clue was required to reproduce a piece of the cipher text, and conclusions could thence be drawn as to which book was used. In the case of one Allied transmission in the summer of 42, five or six French words of a text were ascertained, leading to the conclusion that the cipher book dealt with the Spanish Civil War. In view of this assumption, all French books about the Spanish Civil War in the State Libraries of PARIS, MADRID and LISBON were read with the object of tying in these particular 5 - 6 words. The book was found. FW always looked on a great research effort as worth while. The greatest weakness in using books for enciphering lay in the fact that, once a book had been compromised, an entire transmission could be broken automatically. The weakness existed even if the book in question could not be secured in the same edition or impression. It was still possible for Referat VAUCK (though again only after considerable research) to find the right place in the book and to secure a fluent deciphering system by means of conversion tables.

29. Another weakness of Allied agent ciphers was the use of poetry. Here the verse metre was an additional help in solving the cipher text, as was done in the case of a Czech transmission in the autumn of 42/43.

30. As a rule, the cipher discipline of Allied agents was good. Breaches of security were seldom committed. Those mistakes that were made could usually be traced back to a weakness in the cipher system itself.

Movements in 44-45

31. In the autumn of 44 Referat VAUCK, while still at DORF ZINNA near JÜTERBOG, was transferred from In 7/VI to Gruppe IV Gen d Nachr Aufkl and thence to Gruppe V, OKW/Chi. The change was a purely formal one and did not affect the work of the section.

32. On 13 Apr 45 Referat VAUCK moved to SOUTH GERMANY by train with the bulk of OKW/Fu. The train was routed to BAD REICHENHALL via DRESDEN. FW does not know whether the train ever reached its destination.

General

ALLIED AGENT ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE AS SEEN THROUGH FUNKÜBER-WACHUNG

33. The cases mentioned below are only known to FW by hearsay. He was only concerned with count-espionage work in so far as he was ultimately responsible for the policy of Referat VAUCK in 42/43. In 44/45 he picked up additional data from Oblt VAUCK himself. FW cannot provide exact details on Allied agents' names, cover names or numbers.

Western EUROPE

34. The picture, as far as Allied agent transmissions in Western EUROPE were concerned, was always clear and complete. The number of wireless links which were either stopped or turned round by the Germans, or links that could be easily followed and which consequently were not interfered with, was comparatively large. It was possible in many British "pick-up" undertakings to arrest the agents at the actual moment when they were either picked up or landed at a certain point. Poor coordination within the Abwehr was a hindrance to this work, so that in one case (spring 44) counter-measures against a "pick-up" undertaking failed, even though the time and place of this undertaking were already known two weeks in advance through signals channels.

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ALLIED AGENT ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE AS SEEN THROUGH FUNK-ÜBERWACHUNG (contd)

Southern FRANCE and SPAIN

35. In Southern FRANCE from the end of 42 US agents were employed on a large scale SOUTH of the former demarcation line. These agents were in W/T contact with stations in SPAIN. British agents, who used to smuggle escaped prisoners of war across the Spanish border on a considerable scale, also carried on W/T traffic across the border, which was intercepted. Likewise the Spanish Republicans located in Southern FRANCE were in W/T contact with SPAIN. To cope with this traffic, a camouflaged Aussenstelle was organised by Funküberwachung in MADRID. The station was directly controlled from BERLIN. It was primarily to assist the Spanish General Staff in intercepting Spanish Republican traffic.

36. The first employment of short-base DF in MADRID brought good results against non-registered wireless traffic which originated from various Embassies and had until then not been known to the Spaniards. Results against wireless traffic running through Southern FRANCE to SPAIN were also very good. Traffic between SPAIN and MOSCOW via BARI (?) was intercepted. No code breaking was undertaken at this Aussenstelle. Oblt ENSELEIT, who had been Ic this branch since Mar 44, was relieved of his cond towards the end of 44. He made the mistake of accepting a social invitation from some British people he met in MADRID, and in turn he invited these people to meet members of his own unit. PW believes that one of the latter, under the influence of alcohol, betrayed the nature of the work he was doing.

RUSSIA

37. On the Russian side, PW knows of three important networks: the "Rote 3" net, operating from SWITZERLAND in 42 - which as far as PW knows was not deciphered; the SCHULZE-BOYSEN net operating in BERLIN in 42, which was deciphered, and two links running from BRUSSELS which, as far as PW knows, were not deciphered.

38. The testimony of OS/2305 Regierungsrat Dr HÜTTENHAIN and OS/2306 Sdf(Z) Dr FRICKE, both of OKW/Chi, sheds a different light on the "Rote 3" story:

39. Early in 43 OKW/Chi was requested to assist OKW/Fu in cracking certain traffic that had been picked up in the agent network "Rote 3". As far as PW can remember, the messages dealt with had a special indicator group (24680 ?). This traffic was investigated by Prof NOVOPASCHENNY and Angestellter TRIPPE and SCHMIDT. SCHMIDT solved ten messages on the same cipher. This consisted of a numerical substitution key with single and double digits reciphered with a numerical reciphering key. Once this had been achieved, SCHMIDT's work was concluded and Referat VAUCK consolidated the results and discovered that the reciphering was based on a book text. Neither PW, nor HÜTTENHAIN and FRICKE, have any information to give on the results of the activities of Prof NOVOPASCHENNY and Angestellter TRIPPE.

40. Referat VAUCK also concerned itself from mid-42 to mid-43 with working on wireless traffic between Russian partisans in occupied RUSSIA and their HQ in MOSCOW. Through lack of material, no sensational results were achieved to begin with. Only after KNA VI had been committed against the partisans, with a special cryptographic section under Oblt SCHUBERT, was it possible to achieve good results. The wireless traffic between forward partisan units consisted of simple front-line procedures which were continuously broken and read by the cryptographic section of Horchleitstelle LOETZEN.

ALLIED AGENT ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE AS SEEN THROUGH FUNKÜBER-WACHUNG (contd)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

41. Wireless security intercept was successful in operation against Czechoslovak resistance. Here VAUCK worked in cooperation with Ast PRAGUE. As far as PW knows, two links running to ENGLAND were broken into in 42 and 43. By reading the traffic it was possible in two cases to arrest British agents, one of them a Captain, on landing, as the time and details of their missions were known beforehand. Nevertheless, an attempt on the part of the Germans to play back wireless traffic on the basis of cipher material captured from these agents was unsuccessful.

42. The greatest success was achieved by intercepting the wireless communications of the leader of the Czech Resistance Movement in LONDON. This is the only case where PW is sure it was possible for Referat VAUCK to break into an agent network by purely crypto-analytic methods. The Czech chief was, as far as ciphers were concerned, apparently very poorly advised. He transmitted many long messages which were sometimes divided into ten or more parts, wrote his name, believed by PW to be MAREK, under each message, and each time in the same part of the text. These breaches of security, along with the interception of identically long messages, made an inroad possible. The book used for enciphering was found; the cipher key was taken from a poem. In Sep 42 the Czechs were about to go over to a new cipher but were foolish enough to name the book for enciphering from 1 Oct 42 in the old cipher. Contents of messages cracked on this link were nearly always concerned with reports on the political situation and activities of the Czech Resistance Movement. This type of information was so important that for a long time the wireless traffic was allowed to continue unhindered. PW does not know when and with what results arrests were made.

The BALKANS

43. Wireless security intercept in the BALKANS was, apart from the police monitoring of the Orpo in ZAGREB, carried out mainly in BELGRADE through an independent detachment of Kdr Nachr Aufkl 4 (ATHENS). The local Det cond was Lt WOLLNY, who had served with the evaluation section of Fu III in 41/42, and was therefore considered especially suited for this job. The commitment of this detachment under Army control was necessary because the fighting against all hostile organisations - such as MIHAILOVIC and TITO - was directed by the Army, while the Abwehr retired into the background. The breaking of easy guerilla techniques, particularly the solution of daily recipherings, was carried out in BELGRADE. The more difficult and modern ciphers were solved in BERLIN by the Balkan Referat of In 7/VI under Regierungsrat BAILOVIC, who in this respect supplemented the activities of Referat VAUCK for Fu III. PW states that the internal wireless net of MIHAILOVIC, the Chetniks, the Ustachi etc, could be broken completely. The cipher systems were primitive and mistakes in enciphering numerous.

44. A special effort was made to break the traffic between the English liaison officers with MIHAILOVIC and GHQ CAIRO. As far as PW knows, it was never possible to break the key of these procedures. However, the direction and policy of the British liaison was at all times to be established by breaking the contents of the internal MIHAILOVIC wireless traffic.

ALLIED AGENT ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE AS SEEN THROUGH FUNKÜBER-NACHUNG (contd)

45. TITO's wireless traffic could be deciphered in part. TITO constantly warned MIHAILOVIC that the Germans had full knowledge of his cipher system through traitors. However, no changes were made on the part of MIHAILOVIC. The German cryptographic staff did not fully exploit the capture of TITO's HQ. Preparation and execution of the operation was kept secret from them by the SS. No cipher experts were able to take part in the raid. FW does not know if any valuable cipher material was captured in this action.

POLAND

46. The most notable results in agent deciphering were achieved in the Polish sector. The Germans were able to listen in to the internal wireless traffic of agents operating in POLAND during the WARSAW rising of 44. From this the dispositions of the Polish liberation troops as well as friction between them and the Russians could be established. It was possible, moreover, to crack all wireless traffic which the Polish Government in LONDON carried on with its organisations in POLAND. The methods by which these transmissions were compromised are not knows to FW. This activity was kept very secret indeed, owing to the importance of the source, which furnished the German Government with up-to-date information on the situation in POLAND and the development of the Polish question. To preserve secrecy, and partly to ensure quicker delivery of the decodes, members of the Polish section of Referat VAUCK, which was then in DORF ZINNA near JÜTERBOG, were transferred in autumn 43 to the Polish Referat of OKW/Chi, Gruppe V (Angestellter BERND) in BERLIN. The clear text was published by OKW/Chi as "VN" (Verlässliche Nachrichten) and given extremely restricted distribution. Simultaneously, Polish wireless traffic was also intercepted by FNEST LAUF, an intercept station of OKW/Chi. This double-interception was ordered deliberately on account of the value of the traffic. A further success against the cipher systems of the Polish Government in exile was achieved over the link LONDON - TURKEY (ANKARA). FW does not know if this system was solved by Referat VAUCK or by the Polish section of OKW/Chi.

47. Results in this field were almost sensational when, just before the Allied invasion of FRANCE, a ban on all WT transmissions from ENGLAND was instituted which included even diplomatic channels; the wireless traffic of Polish agents to ENGLAND, however, continued to operate.

48. In connection with Polish traffic, the testimony of FW CS/2319 Lt MORGENROTH is of interest. He knows for certain that between Jan and Feb 45 Gen d Nachr Aufkl had deciphered a message of the Polish Resistance Movement in which it notified the Polish Government in LONDON that the Russians were deporting Poles in considerable numbers, that the food situation was serious and that the population lived for the most part on ration stores which the Germans had left behind. A message from the Polish Government in exile to the Polish Resistance Movement was also intercepted; in it the latter was requested not to make itself known to the Russians, to hide all weapons, to remain in touch with its cond and await further orders.

GERMANY

49. FW remembers seeing a "VN" shown to him in Sep 44 by Obst KETTLER, Chef OKW/Chi. According to this report, a German Uffz transmitted by wireless to ENGLAND details of the newly constructed signals shelter in the Bendler Block, BERLIN, urgently asking for this to be bombed, as it housed the main GHQ lines. The Uffz resisted arrest and was shot. FW believes a second individual was arrested. FW cannot give further details of this case.

FUNKÜBER-MACHUNG AND THE SCHULZE-BOYSEN CASE

50. In summer 42, Dr LENZ belonged to Referat VAUCK. When the first inroad took place in the SCHULZE-BOYSEN traffic, LENZ mentioned this name (SCHULZE-BOYSEN) to a young colleague, Funker HAYMANN, because he know that HAYMANN used to go to the SCHULZE-BOYSEN's house. HAYMANN then met Frau SCHULZE-BOYSEN and warned her.

51. HAYMANN and LENZ were arrested. HAYMANN admitted that he belonged to the SCHULZE-BOYSEN organisation (which was Communist-inspired) out of conviction, and that he had been given the task of espionage in In 7/VI. He had only been in In 7/VI for two weeks. HAYMANN was condemned to death but nothing could be brought up against LENZ except his repetition of SCHULZE-BOYSEN's name to HAYMANN, and he was therefore released. By agreement with Abwehr, LENZ was left to carry on in In 7/VI. He was transferred to FRANCE and employed there on work against agents until the Allied invasion. In autumn 44 he was transferred at his own request to the Foreign Office, and served in the Aussenstelle KONSTANZ. His subsequent movements are unknown.

52. The SCHULZE-BOYSEN organisation was engaged in espionage on a large scale. The Gestapo had been on its track for some time and, immediately after the deciphering referred to above, began to make arrests. Seventy to eighty people were arrested, about seventy of whom are said to have been condemned to death. The case was kept strictly secret, as some of the accused were employed in the RIM, OKM and OKH.

53. The SCHULZE-BOYSEN organisation worked on behalf of MOSCOW, betraying military secrets of which it obtained possession in considerable measure through its numerous members in the RIM, OKM and OKH. The organisation was in WT communication with SWITZERLAND; messages passed this way were deciphered by VAUCK. It was believed that the contents of these messages were re-transmitted from SWITZERLAND to MOSCOW and to unoccupied FRANCE over the WT not called "Rote 3". But an attempt to break the "Rote 3" traffic by using the clear texts revealed in the SCHULZE-BOYSEN case failed, although great importance was attached to it. The Abwehr and Gestapo had the impression that there must be a traitor in HITLER's immediate entourage, whose messages were being passed by "Rote 3". The courier for this network from GERMANY to SWITZERLAND was supposed to be a Swiss consul (name unknown) who used to hold telephone conversations through FRANKFURT a/MAIN.

54. Up to Jun 43 it was not possible to break the "Rote 3" traffic. VAUCK told FW in autumn 44 that the exact position of the "Rote 3" transmitting station in SWITZERLAND had been discovered, probably through the DF service in Southern FRANCE, and it had been decided to raid this transmitting station. The raid had to be cancelled as apparently the Swiss authorities had forestalled the Germans; the station was evacuated and destroyed before the Germans could take action.

55. SCHULZE-BOYSEN worked as Oblt dR in the RLM (department unknown), as did also an unknown Obst arrested with him. An unknown Oblt zS in the OKM was implicated, as well as HAYMANN and LENZ in the OKH. Frau SCHULZE-BOYSEN was also arrested.

56. The Abwehr, on its side, handled the case through Obstlt ROHLEDER and Hptm PANNWITZ. The Gestapo was represented.

C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.)
17 Sep 45

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17 Sep 45

TOP SECRET
S.I.R. 1726

APPENDIX

PERSONALITIES

OKW/Fu

1. Obst BAYER
   Head of dept until summer 42. Then appointed comd a tank regt.

2. Obst BURTSCHER
   Head of dept summer 42 to autumn 44. Upon release he received comd of an GAF signals replacement unit.

3. Obst ROSENKRANZ
   GAF Sigs offr. Head of dept after autumn 44.

OKW/Fu I

4. Obstlt WOLLMAN
   Head of section until Jan 44, predecessor unknown. Was subsequently appointed comd of Nachr Abt 7 in ITALY. He died there in May 44.

5. Maj v LAFFERT
   Head of section Jan 44 - Apr 45, when he was appointed comd of a GAF signals bn on the HELA peninsula. PW does not know if he had a successor.

6. Hptm POHMER
   Assistant to Maj v LAFFERT. It is possible that he took over after the latter departed.

7. Amtmann MOHR
   Special adviser in wireless matters until Apr 45.

8. Hptm MUSHAKE
   Special technical adviser from approximately the end of 43. After the division of OKW into Northern and Southern sections, he went with Obst ROSENKRANZ and Amtmann MOHR to Wehrmachtsnachrichtenführer A at PLOEN. About 22 Apr 45 he was transferred to OKW/Chi A to supervise cipher distribution. At the time of surrender he was in the FLENSBURG area.

OKW/Fu II

9. Obstlt FUCHS
   Head of the section throughout the war.

OKW/Fu III

10. Maj v BARY
    Head of section from the beginning of 42 to the end of the war.

11. Maj v WEDELL
    Deputy to Maj v BARY until the end of hostilities.

12. Oblt LORENTZEN
    Head of Aussenstelle in FRANCE until the end of 43.

13. Hptm FREIER
    Head of Aussenstelle in FRANCE from the end of 43 to same time in 44.

14. Lt ENSELEIT
    Head of Aussenstelle in MADRID till the end of 44.